Infrastructure Control: Who Holds the Telecom Backbone?

8 Apr 2026 By Michael Tremain Long Form Deep Dive Keywords: telecom backbone,undersea cables,infrastructure control,chokepoints,surveillance

Michael Tremain writes long form investigative features examining power structures, corporate influence, and hidden financial interests.

I explore how control of undersea cables, fibre backbones and routing points creates strategic chokepoints with surveillance and economic consequences.

I have been tracking telecom backbone control for years and our team keeps finding the same pattern. Whoever owns or can influence landing stations, carrier hotels and core routers can shape traffic, intercept data and disrupt services. This is not theory alone. Books like James Bamford's investigation and the Snowden archive show how states and corporations manoeuvre for access. In this piece I explain the landscape, show where the chokepoints are, and set out the gaps in public evidence that still worry me and many independent researchers.

Why the backbone matters

I start with basics. The internet you use runs on physical infrastructure. Undersea cables, terrestrial long haul fibre, carrier hotels and internet exchange points concentrate traffic into a few locations. That concentration produces chokepoints. Control of a single landing station or routing fabric can offer a country or corporation outsized leverage over information flows and commerce. Author James Bamford documented similar dynamics around NSA access in The Shadow Factory and the Snowden leaks gave hard detail on collection points.

What we found investigating ownership and influence

Our team followed corporate filings, purchase records and contractor lists to map claims of ownership and operational control. I traced acquisitions and partnerships that move control quietly from one entity to another. For example Reuters reported on the sale of Huawei Marine assets and the ripple effect across cable projects. TeleGeography's submarine cable map and carrier filings provide public footprints. When a few firms appear repeatedly on landing station contracts and in cable consortia I get sceptical. That pattern creates single points where traffic is visible and potentially modifiable.

Technical chokepoints and routing risk

Routing protocols and exchange points add another layer of vulnerability. Border Gateway Protocol history shows how accidental or malicious route announcements can redirect huge volumes of traffic. Independent network researchers like Doug Madory document repeated incidents. A state actor with access to backbone operators or exchange infrastructure can create targeted outages or persistent interception without needing to tap every cable.

Leaked documents and the gaps they leave

The Snowden archive and investigative reporting by Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill exposed collection programmes and partnerships. Those leaks prove capability and intent in some states. But they do not give a full ledger of private sector collaborations, nor do they reveal all cable landing agreements. Financial records and company filings fill some blanks yet important contracts remain private. I do not pretend to hold the whole picture. Our team names trends and points to documents others have uncovered. Where there are gaps we flag them honestly and push for more transparency.

Why this should worry you

Control of backbone chokepoints is not only a spy story. It is an economic and political lever. Disruption can stall commerce. Interception undermines privacy and business secrets. Consolidation around a few vendors or operators increases systemic risk in ways that regulators and the public barely grasp. International competition for influence over landing stations and cable routes is a strategic theatre most citizens do not see unless service fails or leaks appear.

What I want to see next

I want more public cargo lists for cables, transparent ownership records for landing stations and independent audits of exchange points. Scholars and journalists can push this. Regulators and industry have roles too. Until then I will keep following filings and leaks, and I will challenge cosy secrecy wherever I find it.

References and sources

I do not claim responsibility for all source material and I do not accept personal credit for documents uncovered by other reporters and leakers. Sign up to our newsletter for daily briefs.